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scribe processes of coalition formation where several players may enter or leave
the current coalition at any point in (discrete) time and convergence to the
grand coalition is not necessarily prescribed. Transitions from one coalition
to the next are assumed to be random and to yield a Markov chain. Three
examples of such processes (the Shapley-Weber process, the Metropolis pro-
cess, and an example of a voting situation) and their properties are presented.
A main contribution includes notions of value for such series, i.e., schemes
for the evaluation of the expected contribution of a player to the coalition
process relative to a given cooperative game. Particular processes permit to
recover the classical Shapley value. This methodology’s power is illustrated
with well-known examples from exchange economies due to Shafer (1980) and
Scafuri and Yannelis (1984), where the classical Shapley value leads to coun-
terintuitive allocations. The Markovian process value avoids these drawbacks
and provides plausible results.
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21 Introduction
The Shapley value is an allocation scheme for both TU- and NTU-games that is
widely applied in economics (see, e.g., van den Brink et al. (2007); Bergantin˜os
and Lorenzo-Freire (2008); Liggett et al. (2009); van den Brink et al. (forth-
coming), and a list of references in Aumann (1985, 1987)). Its success can be
explained by the fact that it always exists and obeys generally accepted ra-
tionality axioms. Nevertheless, there are realistic situations where it produces
strikingly counterintuitive results, as pointed out by, e.g., Roth (1980), Shafer
(1980), Scafuri and Yannelis (1984). The two latter references describe situa-
tions in exchange economies where a player with no initial endowment obtains
positive consumption of each good at the equilibrium value allocation and the
latter is not in the core. Moreover, Scafuri and Yannelis (1984) point out that
players with identical utility functions and endowments might be treated un-
equally. As judiciously remarked by Aumann (1985), similar counterintuitive
examples exist for other notions in game theory (e.g., Nash equilibrium and
core). Yet, one would not want to abandon them.
On the other hand, counterintuitive examples can become starting points
towards more general notions and shed new light on existing theory. An exam-
ination of the various comments on Roth’s and Shafer’s examples by Aumann
(1985) and Hart and Kurz (1983) suggests in particular that the key point is
knowing what agent is allowed/supposed to meet with what other agent – and
in what order1. Hart and Kurz approach this issue by imposing some coalition
structure and neglect the dynamic aspect of time (or order). In constrast, our
approach focuses on the latter by introducing the model of a coalition pro-
cess that evolves in time. We will demonstrate that this notion permits a very
flexible definition of the Shapley value, which we call (Shapley) process value,
and may avoid the undesirable features exhibited in Shafer’s and Scafuri and
Yannelis’ examples.
Observe that the time dimension is already implicit in Shapley’s work on
cooperative solution concepts (cf. Shapley (1953b)). Let v be the characteristic
function of some TU-game on the set N of agents. To assess the average
contribution of a given agent i ∈ N towards the total benefit v(N), Shapley lets
his agents enter an originally empty room one by one until the grand coalition
N is assembled. The contribution of i is the marginal difference v(S∪ i)−v(S)
with respect to the set S already present. Taking all possible ways for this to
happen (i.e., all total orders on N) into account, one can compute the average
1 This is salient in Aumann’s description of Roth’s example. Roth involves three players
who must share 1. Acting alone, each player can secure 0. If players 1 and 3, or 2 and 3,
form a coalition, then 3 gets 1 − p, and the other players get p, with p < 1 − p. If 1 and
2 form a coalition, they get 1/2 each. The grand coalition would use a random device for
picking a 2-person coalition and then dividing as above. Aumann supplies the following
story: “Suddenly the phone rings in 1’s home; 3 is on the line with an offer [....] Then 1
realizes that if he does so, and if 3 manages to get in touch with 2 before he (1) does, then
he won’t get anything at all out of the game [...]”. For Shafer’s example and its view by
Hart and Kurz, where similar sentences can be found, we give a description in Section 2.
3contribution of i. So Shapley models a particular coalition process (or scenario)
whose evolution is restricted to the sequential addition of single agents until
the grand coalition N is formed. Shapley’s approach was later generalized to
the model of so-called probabilistic values (Weber, 1988) and random values
(Faigle and Voss, forthcoming).
The Shapley-Weber view is quite narrow: First, why should the computa-
tion consider all possible orders? Second, why should agents enter just one by
one, and why is nobody allowed to leave the room? The latter question raises
another one: Why should the process terminate with the grand coalition?
The aim of our current investigation is to ideally drop any such restriction
on scenarios and to admit a priori any sequence of coalitions23. Two questions
then arise. First: For what reasons should a coalition S evolve into another
coalition T ? Second, since an all-comprehensive model would be too loose to
study: What kind of scenarios should the model admit?
Our model is motivated by the idea that acting and interacting agents form
coalitions where they gain individually from the cooperation. The cooperation
may result from individual preferences of agents on coalitions (like in hedonic
games) or from certain individual utility functions, or simply from the char-
acteristic function v itself4. These details are not our concern, however. We
just assume some hidden and unknown mechanism to exist and cause these
preferences, which leads us to the second question. We assume that the pro-
cess evolves in discrete time steps and that we usually have neither complete
information nor certainty about the coalition status at a given time t. We
model this situation by a probability distribution p(t) on 2N that arises from
an initial state p(0) and evolves according to a memory-less Markov chain5 on
the set 2N of ”ground states” (i.e., possible coalitions).
We then turn to the problem of establishing a Shapley-type value for such
a process, that is, of evaluating the average (or expected) contribution of a
player. We introduce two different definitions for a Shapley process value and
provide axiomatizations for both of them. Interestingly, our axioms are quite
2 The notion of a coalition process is not far from that of coalition formation in a very
literal sense. However, most work on coalition formation (see, e.g., the survey (Hajdukova´,
2006)) deals with partitions (i.e., coalition structures) and is concerned more with stability
(Le Breton and Weber, 2005; Xue, 1998) and the question why coalitions form (due to
preferences of players etc.) rather than how they form (mathematical properties of coalition
evolution).
3 Note that the aspects of time and structure coincide in Shapley’s model, where the
scenarios are exactly the maximal chains from ∅ to N in (2N ,⊆). Our approach treats these
as independent aspects.
4 An example of a different nature arises from a situation where voters are asked for a
yes/no decision with initial set S of yes-voters. After some discussion, some players may
change their mind, so that a different set T of yes-voters arises and a new discussion takes
place etc. (cf. Example 3.1.3 below)
5 In the field of coalition formation, a related Markov approach is taken by Konishi and
Ray (2003).
4close to the classical ones given by Shapley and thus shed some (new) light on
them.
The paper is organized as follows. We motivate our approach in Section 2
with well-known examples from exchange economies that exhibit undesirable
features of the classical Shapley value. We show how our approach can flexi-
bly avoid these drawbacks. We then enter details in Section 3. We introduce
Markovian coalition processes and give three examples of such processes, in-
cluding the classical Shapley paradigm. Section 4 provides two different (Shap-
ley) process values and illustrates them on the examples of Section 3. Axiom-
atizations of the two values are established in Section 5.
Most of the proofs are deferred to the Appendix. For easier notation, our
exposition will often omit braces around singletons.
2 A motivating example in exchange economies
An exchange economy consists of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, a commod-
ity space Rl+ and initial endowments ωi ∈ R
l
+ as well as individual utility
functions ui : R
l
+ → R for the agents i ∈ N . Given the non-negative vector
λ = (λ1, . . . , λn), the exchange economy gives rise to the TU-game (N, vλu),
where
vλu(S) := max
xi∈Rl+
∑
i∈S
λiui(xi) subject to
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈S
ωi
associates with the coalition S ⊆ N the maximum λ-weighted utility the agents
in S can achieve by exchanging their commodities.
The vector tuple {xi}i∈N is said to be a (cardinal) value allocation if some
non-trivial λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ Rn+ exists such that (λ1u1(x1), . . . , λnun(xn))
is the Shapley value of the TU-game (N, vλu). Under mild hypotheses, Shafer
(1980) has proved that a value allocation always exists.
2.1 Example 1 (Hart and Kurz (1983))
Assume the exchange economy involves three agents and two commodities
(”left gloves” and ”right gloves”) and hence l = 2. Where ǫ is a small quantity,
the next table summarizes the data:
agent initial endowment utility function
1 (1− ǫ, 0) min(x, y)
2 (0, 1− ǫ) min(x, y)
3 (ǫ, ǫ) x+y2
5Agents 1 and 2 are looking for pairs of gloves, while agent 3 is just interested
in the leather. λ = (1, 1, 1) is easily seen to yield
vλu({1}) = vλu({2}) = 0, vλu({3}) = ǫ
vλu({1, 2}) = 1− ǫ, vλu({1, 3}) = vλu({2, 3}) =
1 + ǫ
2
vλu({1, 2, 3}) = 1
with Shapley value
Sh1(vλu) = Sh2(vλu) =
5
12
(1− ǫ), Sh3(vλu) =
1
6
(1 + ǫ).
Consequently,{( 5
12
(1− ǫ),
5
12
(1− ǫ)
)
,
( 5
12
(1− ǫ),
5
12
(1− ǫ)
)
,
(1
6
(1 + ǫ),
1
6
(1 + ǫ)
)}
is a cardinal value allocation with λ = (1, 1, 1). Let us comment on this solu-
tion.
Observe first the following: Given the utility functions and the initial en-
dowments, the above approach yields a unique solution, despite the fact that
one could imagine different outcomes depending on how the agents meet. This
is well illustrated in Aumann’s description (see footnote 1), and we will come
back to this issue later.
Notice furthermore that the solution is not in the core of the game: Coali-
tion {1, 2} can block it by proposing the allocation
(
6
12
(1− ǫ),
6
12
(1− ǫ), (ǫ, ǫ)),
which provides a feasible and strictly greater utility for agents 1,2. So this
approach does not satisfy coalitional rationality in general. Moreover, the so-
lution is counterintuitive in the sense that agent 3, who started with (ǫ, ǫ),
ends up with about 1/6 of the goods – even when ǫ→ 0.
The agents 1 and 2, being rational and aware of the disadvantage of the
solution above, want to avoid it. Hart and Kurz write: “What can 1 and 2 do?
By forming a “union” (thus inducing the coalition structure {{1, 2}, {3}}), they
eliminate the possibility that 3 will be able to “catch” one of them “alone”. [...]
However, after deciding to form a coalition, they do not “leave” the game but
rather bargain with 3, [...] which will improve everyone’s outcome.”.
The preceding story gives a simple example of what we call a coalition
formation process: Agents 1 and 2 are initially alone. They decide to form a
coalition and finally join with agent 3. We view coalition formation processes
as (Markovian) stochastic processes, whose realizations are scenarios. Roughly
speaking, scenarios are sequences of coalitions of “active” players, starting from
some coalition and ending in some terminal coalition (though not necessarily
6the grand coalition as in the present example)6. By “active players”, we mean
agents who can bargain together. Hence we distinguish between agents in the
game and outside the game. Only those in the game can bargain. In the present
situation, we have two possible scenarios (denoting {1, 2} by 12, etc.):
S1 : ∅ − 1− 12− 123
S2 : ∅ − 2− 12− 123
They are taken to be equiprobable as there is no reason to favor one of the
agents. The underlying Markov process for these scenarios is depicted in the
figure below (numbers on arrows indicate transition probabilities and are omit-
ted when the transition is certain).
∅
2
1
12 123
1/2
1/2
Note that the scenarios in the classical view of Shapley correspond to all
possible orders in which players enter the game. Hence in the present situation,
we would would also have to include these 4 scenarios:
S3 : ∅ − 1− 13− 123
S4 : ∅ − 2− 23− 123
S5 : ∅ − 3− 13− 123
S6 : ∅ − 3− 23− 123
However, they are clearly ruled out by the fact that agents 1 and 2 want to
avoid any bargaining with 3 before they engage in the coalition {1, 2}.
It remains to compute a Shapley-like value for our two scenarios. Proceed-
ing exactly as in the classical situation, we compute the marginal contribution
of each agent in the two scenarios S1, S2. We find
φS11 (vλu) = vλu(1) = 0,
φS12 (vλu) = vλu(12)− vλu(1) = 1− ǫ,
φS13 (vλu) = vλu(123)− vλu(12) = ǫ
φS21 (vλu) = 1− ǫ, φ
S2
2 (vλu) = 0, φ
S2
3 (vλu) = ǫ.
Hence averaging yields
φ1(vλu) =
1− ǫ
2
= φ2(vλu), φ3(vλu) = ǫ
6 As will be detailed later, scenarios may be of infinite length, perhaps not even converging
to some terminal state.
7and thus the following value allocation with λ = (1, 1, 1):{(1− ǫ
2
,
1− ǫ
2
)
,
(1− ǫ
2
,
1− ǫ
2
)
,
(
ǫ, ǫ
)}
.
This solution avoids the drawbacks of the previous one. First, it is in the
core since no coalition can block it. Second, it is more natural than the previous
solution, in particular with view on the allocation of agent 3. Third, it is
more flexible since not necessarily unique. More precisely, it is unique once the
process is fixed. But one may consider different processes in order to model
different “stories”. The above process follows exactly the description of the
story of Hart and Kurz. However, we may consider it as too simplistic, and
envisage some possibility for agent 3 to “catch” agent 1 or 2 alone with some
probability p. This story would yield the following process:
∅ 1
2
12
13
23
123
1/2
1/2
1-p
p
1-p
p
Its scenarios are (under the previous notation) S1, S2, S3, S4 with probabilities
(1− p)/2, (1− p)/2, p/2, p/2 respectively. We find
φS31 = 0, φ
S3
2 =
1− ǫ
2
, φS33 =
1 + ǫ
2
, φS41 =
1− ǫ
2
, φS42 = 0, φ
S4
3 =
1 + ǫ
2
,
so that the computation of the expected value leads to
φ1 = φ2 =
(1− ǫ
2
)(
1−
p
2
)
, φ3 =
p
2
(1− ǫ) + ǫ.
Again, this defines a cardinal value allocation {(φ1, φ1), (φ2, φ2), (φ3, φ3)},
which is not necessarily in the core, however. For p = 0 we recover the previous
process while p = 1/2 produces φ3 = (1 + 3ǫ)/4. This relatively high value
reflects the following aspect: If agent 3 can bargain with 1 or 2, he must have
a better “utility producing technology” than agents 1 or 2 and thus a higher
intrinsic value.
2.2 Example 2 (Scafuri and Yannelis (1984))
We turn to Scafuri and Yannelis’ example of an undesirable “unequal treat-
ment effect” and explain how our approach can circumvent it very easily7.
There are again three agents, two commodities, the utility functions
u1(x, y) = u2(x, y) =
(1
2
xρ +
1
2
yρ
)1/ρ
, u3(x, y) =
(1
2
xβ +
1
2
yβ
)1/β
,
7 see also the discussion of Aumann (1987)
8with 0 ≤ ρ < β ≤ 1, and initial endowments ω1 = (1, 0), ω2 = (0, 1) and
ω3 = (0, 0). Since
(
1
2
xβ +
1
2
yβ)1/β ≥ (
1
2
xρ +
1
2
yρ)1/ρ,
the present example is similar to the previous one in the sense that the Shapley
value will yield an allocation where agent 3 receives a positive amount, which
therefore cannot be in the core.
Let us now add a fourth agent with same utility and endowment as agent 3
but with unequal weights: λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1 and 0 ≤ λ4 <
1
2
((1/ρ)−(1/β))
.
Notice that the the utility of player 4 is less than those of agents 1 and 2:
λ4
(1
2
xβ +
1
2
yβ
)1/β
<
(1
2
xρ +
1
2
yρ
)1/ρ
.
The associated TU-game has the characteristic function
vλu(1) = vλu(2) =
(1
2
)1/ρ
, vλu(3) = vλu(4) = 0, vλu(13) = vλu(23) =
(1
2
)1/β
vλu(14) = vλu(24) =
(1
2
)1/ρ
, vλu(12) = 1, vλu(34) = 0
vλu(123) = vλu(124) = vλu(1234) = 1, vλu(134) = vλu(234) =
(1
2
)1/β
.
Agents 3 and 4 are substitutes : They have the same utility function and initial
endowment. We speak of unequal treatment if substitute agents are allocated
differently. Observe that the Shapley value treats 3 and 4 unequally:
Sh3(vλu) =
1
3
((1
2
)1/β
−
(1
2
)1/ρ)
, Sh4(vλu) = 0
Sh1(vλu) = Sh2(vλu) =
1− Sh3(vλu)
2
.
Our methodology avoids the unequal treatment effect: As agents 3 and 4
are substitutes, it seems reasonable for them to play symmetric roˆles in the
“story”. That is, agents 1 and 2 still want to form a coalition before meeting
either agent 3 or 4. This implies the following process:
∅
1
2
12
124
123
1234
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
9There are four equiprobable scenarios:
S1 : ∅ − 1− 12− 123− 1234
S2 : ∅ − 1− 12− 124− 1234
S3 : ∅ − 2− 12− 123− 1234
S4 : ∅ − 2− 12− 124− 1234
It is easy to see that
φSi3 = φ
Si
4 = 0, i = 1, . . . , 4
so that the allocations to agents 3 and 4 are symmetric (and null).
By modifying the process and altering the symmetry between agents 3 and
4, it is possible to introduce some unequal treatment. For example, we may
consider some scenario S where agent 3 meets agent 1 or 2 alone with some
probability, e.g.,
∅ − 1− 13− 123− 1234.
We would then have φS3 =
(
1
2
)1/β
−
(
1
2
)1/ρ
, while φS4 is still 0. Interestingly,
even a scenario like S′ = ∅− 1− 14− 124−1234 would lead to φS
′
4 = 0. This is
because the “utility producing technology” of agent 4 (due to the condition on
λ4) is weaker than the one of agent 3. Nevertheless, we recognize the flexibility
our approach bears on these benchmark examples.
3 Markovian coalition processes
Let N := {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players/agents and denote by 2N the
family of all subsets (”coalitions”) S ⊆ N . Viewing the formation of a coalition
as a process that evolves over discrete time, a realization (or scenario) of
a coalition (formation) process is a sequence (string) of (possibly repeated)
coalitions
S = S0S1 · · ·Sk · · · .
No special assumption on S is made for the moment. Purely formally, in full
generality, the process starts in some ”empty state”  at time t = 0 and then
moves to some coalition S1 ⊆ N at time t = 1. In most applications, however,
the process starts naturally at ∅, so we will usually consider simply S0 = ∅,
and call it a normal process8. Moreover, in order to account for incomplete
information, we treat the evolution from one step to the next one as a random
event. If the process has attained the coalition S at time t− 1, we denote the
probability of the transition S → T , i.e., for reaching T at time t, by u
(t−1)
S,T .
8 The distinction between  and ∅ may appear artificial at this stage. However, it is
necessary since it may happen that ∅ is an absorbing state, i.e., no more transition is
possible from this state. This will be the case in Example 3.1.3.
10
In the present investigation, we concentrate exclusively on processes whose
transition probabilities u
(t−1)
S,T are independent of t and denote theses therefore
simply by uS,T . So the transitions are characterized by the transition matrix
U := [uS,T ]S,T⊆N .
If S = S0S1 · · ·Sk is a finite scenario of a normal coalition process with
transition matrix [uS,T ], the probability Pr(S) of the occurrence of S is easily
computed. Setting Pr(S0) := 1, we have:
Pr(S0S1 · · ·Sk) = Pr(S0)uS0,S1 · · ·uSk−1,Sk =
k∏
i=1
uSi−1,Si . (1)
Observe that a transition matrixU with coefficients uS,T is row-stochastic,
that is, uS,T ≥ 0 and
∑
T⊆N uS,T = 1 holds for all S ⊆ N .
We refer to a coalition process with a time independent transition matrix
U as being Markovian.
3.1 Examples
3.1.1 Shapley-Weber processes
Our first example shows that the classical paradigm of Shapley is captured
by our framework. We define a Shapley-Weber process as a normal Markovian
coalition process whose transition probabilities uS,T have the Shapley-Weber
property:
(SW) uN,N = 1 and uS,T = 0 unless S = T \ i holds for some i ∈ T .
A Shapley process is a special Shapley-Weber process whose transition
probabilities uS,T satisfy the condition
(S) uS,T =
1
n−|S| if S = T \ i holds for some i ∈ T .
In the case n = 3, the transition matrixU of the associated Shapley process
is (with blanks indicating zeroes):
U =
∅00 100 200 120 300 130 230 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123
2
6666666664
00 1/3 1/3 00 1/3 00 00 123
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
1
1/2 1/2
1
1
1
3
7777777775
The scenarios of Shapley-Weber processes correspond to the n! maximal
chains
∅ = S0 ⊂ S1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Sn−1 ⊂ Sn = N
11
of coalitions. In the special case of a Shapley process the scenarios are equiprob-
able with the probabilities Pr(S0, . . . , Sn) = 1/n!.
Shapley processes underlie the classical coalition formation model of Shap-
ley (1953a), while general Shapley-Weber processes provide the framework for
Weber’s theory of probabilistic values (Weber, 1988). The so-called weighted
Shapley value, introduced in Shapley (1953b), is a special instance of a prob-
abilistic value (see also Kalai and Samet (1987)) and hence also captured by
our model.
3.1.2 The Metropolis process
A Shapley process in the strict sense is independent of a particular charac-
teristic function v : 2N → R that might be defined on the collection 2N of
possible coalitions, while the Shapley-Weber model offers some flexibility to
allow random transitions S → T whose probabilities uS,T depend on v(S) and
v(T ). Metropolis et al. (1953) have proposed a process for statistical sampling,
which can be viewed as a Markovian coalition process in our context and takes
a given function v : 2N → R into account. The Metropolis process M is defined
as follows:
– Choose a ”temperature” θ > 0, and start from ∅.
– Suppose the current coalition is S. The next coalition T is chosen as follows:
(i) Select i ∈ N at random and set
T :=
{
S ∪ i, if i 6∈ S
S \ i, if i ∈ S.
Set δ(S, T ) := v(T )− v(S) and move to T if δ(S, T ) > 0.
(ii) If δ(S, T ) ≤ 0, move to T with probability eδ(S,T )/θ, and stay in S with
probability 1− eδ(S,T )/θ.
The corresponding state transition matrix is given by
uM,θS,T =

1
n ·min{1, e
δ(S,T )/θ}, if T is of the form S ∪ i or S \ i
0, if T 6= S not of this form
1−
∑
R6=S uS,R, if T = S.
Clearly, the transition depends on v and on the temperature θ. One sees
that a favorable transition (i.e., towards a higher value of v) is always carried
out. But unfavorable transitions can occur, too. This is to model a farsighted
process in which a momentary loss may prove beneficial later9. The two lim-
iting cases θ →∞ and θ → 0 are of interest. In the first case, the process can
never remain in the same state (the diagonal is zero) and every unfavorable
transition is executed, while in the second case, no such transition is carried
out.
9 This process has been applied in (Faigle et al., forthcoming) to public regulation policies,
with similar conclusions.
12
We illustrate these two extreme cases for n = 3 with v being strictly
monotonic:
UM,∞ =
∅00 100 200 120 300 130 230 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123
2
6666666664
00 1/3 1/3 00 1/3 00 00 123
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
3
7777777775
UM,0 =
∅00 100 200 120 300 130 230 123
∅
1
2
12
3
13
23
123
2
6666666664
00 1/3 1/3 00 1/3 00 00 123
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
2/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
2/3 1/3
2/3 1/3
1
3
7777777775
Note that the Metropolis process with θ → 0 and v being strictly monotonic
resembles the Shapley process but is different because of the diagonal.
Observe for θ → ∞ that the cardinality of the current S is odd (resp.,
even) at an odd (resp., even) time t. Therefore, the process oscillates between
these two families of coalitions and does not converge.
In contrast, when θ → 0 and v is strictly monotonic, the process converges
to N with probability 1. But unlike in the Shapley process, convergence will
not necessarily occur in n steps. If v is not monotone but v(N) > v(S) holds
for all S ⊂ N , the Metropolis process at low temperature converges to N with
high probability. In all other cases, the Metropolis process will not converge
to the grand coalition and thus differs substantially from the Shapley process.
A general result is given below (see Theorem 1).
3.1.3 A voting model with influence
Imagine N to represent a set of voters who have to make a yes/no decision. Let
us assume that each voter has an inclination to vote yes or no (initial opinion
state at time t = 0) but may change the opinion over time due to the mutual
influence in a phase of discussion among the voters. Denote the set of ’yes’
voters at time t by S(t) and assume that the evolution of S(t) is Markovian.
In this case, the evolution is not dictated by (the characteristic function of)
some game v on N , but by the power of mutual influence. Let us detail an
example which is a simplification of the Confucius model of society presented
in (Hu and Shapley, 2003) and considered also in (Grabisch and Rusinowska,
2009, forthcoming). There are four players in the original model: The king,
the man, the wife and the child. Morevoer, there are three rules:
(i) The man follows the king.
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(ii) The wife and the child follow the man.
(iii) The king should respect his people.
While the first two rules lead to an immediate implementation into an influence
model, the third rule is less clear and can be interpreted in different ways.
Intuitively, it says that the king should give up his project or plan if a majority
of the people opposes it.
For ease of calculation, let us simplify the model and merge wife and child
into one player. Our Markov process (let us call it the Confucius process C)
is best represented by the digraph on Figure 1 (values on edges indicate the
probability of transition, and absence of value means probability 1; players are
numbered as follows: king=1, man=2, wife=3). It is easy to see that there are
∅
3
12 12
1323 123
1/2 1/2
Fig. 1 The digraph Γ of the Confucius process
two classes where the process terminates, namely {123} (everybody says ’yes’)
and {∅} (everybody says ’no’). These are the two consensus situations and the
process terminates in one of these in at most 4 steps. (Note that is not natural
here to start the process from the coalition ∅ ⊆ N but rather from the formal
initial state .)
3.2 Markov chains and random walks
More abstractly, we can view a Markovian coalition process as a stochastic
process (Xt) with the output alphabet Σ = 2
N or, equivalently, as a random
walk on the set 2N . Since the transition matrixU = [uS,T ] of the random walk
is constant over time, (Xt) is a homogeneous Markov chain. Σ = 2
N is the set
of states of the Markov chain.
Let Pr{Xt = S} be the probability that the random walk has attained the
coalition S at time t and consider the vector p(t) := [pS(t)]S⊆N of probabilities
pS(t) := Pr{Xt = S}. Then the following relation is well-known from the
theory of Markov chains (and easy to verify):
p(t) = p(t− 1)U = · · · = p(0)Ut.
With U, we associate its (directed) transition graph Γ , whose vertices are the
elements S ∈ 2N (hence coalitions) and there is a directed edge from S to T
if and only if uS,T > 0.
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3.3 Convergence
We say that the Markov chain (Xt) converges if the probability distribution
z := lim
t→∞
p(t)
exists and recall some basic facts on the convergence of Markov chains. The
classes of a Markov chain are the strongly connected components of Γ , that is,
sets of states C ⊆ 2N such that, for any pair (S, T ) of distinct states S, T ∈ C,
there is a directed path from S to T in Γ and C is maximal with this property.
Hence, the classes C1, . . . , Ck partition 2N .
A class C is said to be transient if there exists an edge (S, T ) with S ∈ C and
T /∈ C and terminal (or recurrent) otherwise. A terminal class Ci is aperiodic
if the greatest common divisor of the length of all cycles in C is 1 and periodic
otherwise. Now the following facts are given:
– If there is a unique terminal aperiodic class, the Markov process termi-
nates in this class, and the probability vector z = limt→∞ p(t) of the
states/coalitions in this class is the unique probability distribution z with
the property z = zU˜ where U˜ is the submatrix of U corresponding to the
coalitions in the terminal class.
– If the unique terminal class is periodic, limt→∞ p(t) does not exist, but the
Cesaro average limt→∞
1
t (p(1) + p(2) + · · ·+ p(t)) exists, and is found as
above.
– If there are several terminal classes, the process terminates in one of these
classes.
Notice that the Cesaro average always exists, and coincides with the limit
distribution if the latter exists.
Recall that a Shapley-Weber process attains N and terminates in n steps.
So {N} is the unique terminal class. More generally, every Markovian process
with an acyclic transition graph Γ has singleton terminal classes and stops
in one of them after at most n steps. Concerning the Metropolis process, the
following result is well-known (and easy to show).
Theorem 1 Assume 0 < θ < ∞. Then the Metropolis process converges to
the probability vector z(θ) with the 2n components
z
(θ)
S =
ev(S)/θ
Zθ
, where Zθ :=
∑
S∈2N
ev(S)/θ.
For the proof of Theorem 1, one only has to check that the transition graph
of a Metropolis process is strongly connected and has some loops, and that
the probability vector z with the components z
(θ)
S satisfies zU = z, which is
straightforward.
The probability distribution z(θ) is known as a Boltzmann-Gibbs distribu-
tion in physics and in information theory.
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3.4 Entropy
Given any v : 2N → R, we associate with the probability distribution p on 2N
its expected value
E(v,p) :=
∑
S∈2N
v(S)pS .
In the special case of Boltzmann-Gibbs distributions, straightforward compu-
tation shows:
lim
θ→0
E(v, z(θ)) = max
S∈2N
v(S).
Recalling the entropy of p to be the parameter
H(p) = −
∑
S∈2N
pS log pS ,
it is a well-known fact in information theory that the Boltzmann-Gibbs dis-
tribution maximizes the entropy with respect to a prescribed expected value
in the following sense:
Theorem 2 Let minS∈2N v(S) < ξ < maxS∈2N v(S) be a prescribed parame-
ter. Then there exists a unique θ = θ(ξ) > 0 such that
E(v, z(θ)) = ξ and H(z(θ)) = max{H(p) | E(v,p) = ξ}. (2)
In the context of Markovian coalition formation, the Boltzmann-Gibbs dis-
tribution thus has some remarkable properties:
– If the process converges and we know the expected value ξ of v in the limit
but have no further information on the limiting distribution, we should go
on the assumption that the latter is the corresponding Boltzmann-Gibbs
distribution (Theorem 2).
– If the Metropolis process is carried out with a ”small” θ > 0, then we
can expect the formation of a coalition with a high v-value in the limit
(equation 2).
4 Values for coalition processes
4.1 Scenarios and scenario-values
When the transition graph of the Markov chain has no cycles, the process
clearly stops after a finite number t ≤ 2N of steps. In this case, terminal classes
reduce to terminal coalitions. Moreover, all sequences (scenarios) from some
initial coalition to a terminal one can be enumerated and their probability
of occurrence computed by (1). Often, however, cycles exist and scenarios
may be infinite even when the process eventually converges to some terminal
coalition. No enumeration is thus possible unless one decides to limit (truncate)
the sequence at some time t and to consider the sequences from some initial
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coalition to some coalition reachable at time t. One may then want to let t
tend to infinity, provided the limit exists. As a consequence, we can focus on
finite sequences and establish our framework for this case. We will address the
(much more tricky) infinite case Section 4.2.
Let us consider a transition matrix U, some time point t, and the set
S(U, t) of all scenarios produced by U of length at most t. It is important
to note that k < t for a scenario S = S0S1 · · ·Sk in S(U, t) means that Sk
is a terminal coalition. In the case k = t, the scenario could continue at time
points beyond t. Moreover, when for all scenarios a general bound T on the
length of any scenario exists (i.e., when the transition graph is acyclic), we
have S(U, T ) = S(U, t) for all t ≥ T .
We set S(U) := S(U,∞) and let G denote the set of all games on N . We
introduce also S, the set of all finite sequences of coalitions S0S1 · · ·Sk · · · ,
Si ∈ 2N , and S0 can be any set in 2N or the symbol  (formal “empty” state),
setting v() = 010.
Following Grabisch and Funaki (2009), we specify the following concepts:
– A scenario-value is a mapping ψ : G → Rn×S. Components of ψ(v) are
denoted by ψSi (v) for scenario (or sequence) S and player i. We call ψ
S(v)
the scenario-value for scenario (or sequence11) S.
– A value is a mapping Ψ : G → Rn. The value induced by the Markov chain
U and the scenario-value ψ is
Ψ(v) :=
∑
S∈S(U)
πSψ
S(v), (3)
where πS is the probability of occurrence of scenario S. Since the value
depends on the Markovian process, we call it a process value.
The expression (3) is not necessarily well-defined for an infinite process
and it may be useful to restrict oneself to scenarios of length at most t:
Ψ (t)(v) =
∑
S∈S(U,t)
πSψ
S(v).
We will come back to the convergence problem in Section 4.2. Let us now
introduce two particular scenario-values.
So consider the scenario S = S0S1 · · ·St. We define the Shapley I scenario-
value by
φ˜Si (v) :=
∑
k|i∈Sk∆Sk+1
v(Sk+1)− v(Sk)
|Sk+1∆Sk|
, (4)
10 The set S is larger than the set of finite scenarios since beginning by ∅ or  is not
requested. We do this mainly for mathematical convenience, particularly for our axiomati-
zations (see Section 5.1, the concatenation axiom). Anyway, the scenario-values we propose
(see (4), (5)), are well-defined on S.
11 In the whole section, it is understood that all statements related to scenario-values are
valid for all finite sequences, not only finite scenarios.
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where ∆ denotes the symmetric difference (i.e., A∆B = (A ∪ B) \ (A ∩ B)).
The Shapley II scenario-value is defined as
φSi (v) :=
∑
k|i∈Sk∆Sk+1
1
|Sk∆Sk+1|!
∑
P from Sk to Sk+1
(v(S′P)− v(SP)) (5)
where P from S to T is any shortest path from S to T in 2N , and (SP, S
′
P
) is
the (unique) edge of P such that i 6∈ SP and i ∈ S′P or the converse
12.
Both of these scenario-values offer a natural interpretation in terms of
marginal contribution to coalitions (when i enters or leaves). In Shapley I,
the principle of insufficient reason is used, while in Shapley II, we “complete”
the sequence by adding the “missing” edges, considering that in one step,
only one player can leave or enter the coalition. Either value generalizes the
classical Shapley value and coincides with it when |Sk∆Sk+1| = 1 holds for all
k. Although the first one is simple and natural, the second one will prove to
have better properties. The next example illustrates the definition.
Example 1 The following scenario arises from the Confucius process (see Sec-
tion 3.1.3): S = ∅ → 1→ 2→ 13→ 12→ 123. We obtain:
φ˜S1 = v(1) +
1
2
(
v(2)− v(1)
)
+
1
3
(
v(13)− v(2)
)
φ˜S2 =
1
2
(
v(2)− v(1)
)
+
1
3
(
v(13)− v(2)
)
+
1
2
(
v(12)− v(13)
)
φ˜S3 =
1
3
(
v(13)− v(2)
)
+
1
2
(
v(12)− v(13)) + (v(123)− v(12)
)
φS1 = v(1) +
1
2
(
− v(1) + (v(2) − v(12))
)
+
1
6
(
v(1) + 2(v(13)− v(3))+
2(v(12)− v(2)) + (v(123)− v(23))
)
φS2 =
1
2
(
v(2) + (v(12)− v(1))
)
+
1
6
(
− 2v(2) + (v(1)− v(12))
+ 2(v(13)− v(123)) + (v(3)− v(23))
)
+
1
2
(
(v(12)− v(1)) + (v(123)− v(13))
)
φS3 =
1
6
(
2(v(13)− v(1)) + v(3) + (v(123)− v(12)) + 2(v(23)− v(2))
)
+
1
2
(
(v(1)− v(13)) + (v(12)− v(123))
)
+ (v(123)− v(12)).
Figure 2 helps in the computation of φSi .
12 See Example 1 for an illustration. By “shortest path”, we mean a sequence of coalitions
such that between two subsequent coalitions there is exactly one leaving or entering player.
For example, a shortest path from 12 to 234 is 12-123-23-234. The number of shortest paths
from S to T is clearly |S∆T |! (see Figure 2).
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∅ 1 2 13 12 123
∅
12
∅
12
23
1
3
123
1
123
Fig. 2 Scenario S completed for computing the Shapley II value. Boldface figures indicate
nodes of the scenario
A scenario-value ψ is efficient if∑
i∈N
ψSi (v) = v(St)− v(S0) (6)
is true for every scenario S = S0S1 · · ·St and every game v ∈ G. By extension,
the process value induced by an efficient scenario-value is said to be efficient
too.
Lemma 1 The scenario values Shapley I and Shapley II are efficient.
Proof The claim is trivially true for t = 1. Arguing by induction, we consider
any scenario S = S0S1 · · ·StSt+1 and let S′ = S0S1 · · ·St. Then we have
φ˜Si =
{
φ˜S
′
i +
v(St+1)−v(St)
|St+1∆St|
, if i ∈ St∆St+1
φ˜S
′
i , otherwise
for any i ∈M and hence∑
i∈M
φ˜Si (v) =
∑
i∈M
φ˜S
′
i (v) + v(St+1)− v(St) = v(St+1).
Similarly we find
φSi =
{
φS
′
i +
1
|St+1∆St|!
∑
P from St to St+1
(v(S′
P
)− v(SP)), if i ∈ St∆St+1
φS
′
i , otherwise.
Now, by the efficiency of the classical Shapley value applied to the Boolean
lattice [∅, St∆St+1] we obtain∑
i∈M
φSi (v) =
∑
i∈M
φS
′
i (v) + v(St+1)− v(St) = v(St+1).
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4.2 Infinite scenarios
If the graph has cycles or loops, infinite scenarios occur and the value may not
converge. Observe, however, that loops do not matter as they induce a zero
marginal gain. Moreover, it is easy to see that cycles can be dropped from the
computation of Shapley I and II values if, at each time step, there is only one
player entering or leaving.
Formally, let us say that a scenario without loops and cycles is simple and
denote by S∗(U) the set of simple scenarios. Observe that simple scenarios are
of finite length. So S∗(U) is a finite set. Furthermore, we call two scenarios
equivalent if they are identical up to cycles or loops. If S is a simple scenario,
we denote by [S] its equivalence class (with respect to a given U). Then we
have:
Proposition 1 Assume that |Sk∆Sk+1| = 1 holds for all transitions from Sk
to Sk+1 in U. Then, Shapley I and Shapley II values are
Φ(v) =
∑
S∈S∗(U)
π[S]ψ
S(v),
where π[S] =
∑
S′∈[S] πS′ .
In the general case, it is difficult to draw any conclusion. We therefore
assume in the rest of this section that the value in question is either Shapley
I or II or is a value ψ whose scenario-value has the form
ψS =
∑
SkSk+1∈S
δSkSk+1 for any scenario S = S0S1S2 · · · .
Recall that the process may end in some aperiodic terminal class, possibly
reduced to a singleton (terminal state), or in some periodic class, in which
case no convergence occurs.
Consider a simple (and therefore finite) scenario S0 terminating in terminal
state S with scenario-value φ0(v) := φ
S0(v) and probability π0. Let S1 be an
equivalent scenario that differs from S0 by the addition of a cycle C which the
scenario traverses 1 time. Similarly, let S2, S3, . . . be identical to S1 but with
the cycle traversed 2,3, . . . times and the infinite scenario S := limk→∞ Sk.
Let δ(v) := φS1(v) − φ0(v) be the increment of the value obtained by
running through the cycle once and therefore
φSk(v) = φ0(v) + kδ(v).
If δ(v) > 0, then φS clearly tends to infinity. Now, consider the node T where
the process has the choice whether or not to enter the cycle. Then the probabil-
ity η of transition from T to the next node in the cycle (i.e., to enter the cycle)
is strictly less than 1. We have πS1 = ηπ0, and more generally πSk = η
kπ0.
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Hence limk→∞ πSk = 0 results and the contribution of S0, S1, . . . , S in Ψ(v)
remains finite. Indeed,
∞∑
k=0
πSkφ
Sk(v) =
∞∑
k=0
π0η
k(φ0(v) + kδ(v))
=
∞∑
k=0
π0η
kφ0(v) +
∞∑
k=0
kπ0η
kδ(v)
= φ0(v)π0
1
1− η
+ δ(v)π0
η
(1− η)2
.
The result of finiteness for any number of cycles added, or if strongly con-
nected components are added, holds essentially because the probability to
enter a cycle or a strongly connected component is strictly less than 1 (other-
wise, the scenario would not end in the terminal state S). However, the exact
computation of
∑∞
k=0 πSkφ
Sk(v) could be quite involved.
If the terminal class is not a singleton, the value becomes infinite when the
process enters a cycle without leaving it (then η = 1). Note, however, that
this cannot be the case if the class is aperiodic. Nor is necessarily the case
when the class is periodic (see below the example of the Metropolis process
with θ =∞). Nevertheless, one general way to circumvent this difficulty is the
Cesaro average
Ψ(v) := lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
k=1
Ψ (k)(v).
Notice, however, that this limit yields counterintuitive results if there is a
terminal state reachable in a finite number of steps and a periodic class: The
contribution of the former will be zero in the Cesaro limit.
Still another approach is possible for terminal classes which are not reduced
to singletons. As explained in Section 3.3, even for periodic classes, it is possible
to compute the limit probabilities pS for each state S in a terminal class. One
could simply put, as an approximation to the value,
Ψ˜(v) =
∑
C
pC
∑
Sk,Sk+1∈C
δSkSk+1pSkuSk,Sk+1,
where C is any non-singleton terminal class, pC the probability to terminate
in C, and δSkSk+1 the increment in the value when passing from Sk to Sk+1.
The idea behind it is this: Since scenarios spend an infinite amount of time in
these terminal classes, the contributions before reaching terminal classes can
be neglected.
4.3 Examples
We turn to the computation of the (Shapley) process values for examples given
in Section 3.1.
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∅
1 2 3
∅ 12 13 ∅ 12 23 ∅ 13 23
1 2 3 2 1 123 1 3 123 1 2 3 1 2 123 2 3 123 1 2 3 1 3 123 2 3 123
Fig. 3 Set of scenarios S(UM,∞, 3)
Example 2 (Shapley-Weber processes) Clearly, both Shapley I and Shapley II
values coincide with the classical Shapley value in the case of the Shapley
process. Let us examine the case of the Shapley-Weber process. As noted
earlier, the scenarios of Shapley-Weber processes are the n! maximal chains
from ∅ to N . Since |Sk∆Sk+1| = 1 for all scenarios, the values Shapley I and
Shapley II coincide and yield a probabilistic value (Weber, 1988). Conversely,
let ψ be a probabilistic value induced by a probability distribution π on the
set of maximal chains from ∅ to N . We can compute the probability of an edge
(S, T ) with S = T \ i for some i ∈ T :
π(S, T ) =
∑
C∋(S,T )
π(C)
where C denotes a maximal chain. Then choosing transition probabilities
uS,T ∼ π(S, T ) proportionally (i.e., normalizing the row sums to 1), we obtain
a Shapley-Weber process with probabilistic value induced by π.
Example 3 (Metropolis process) Since |Sk∆Sk+1| = 1 both values coincide.
Let us consider the case where θ → 0 first. Clearly, there is only one terminal
coalition which is 123. We know that M0 and S differ only by the diagonal (i.e.,
loops in Γ ) and it is easy to see that loops have no roˆle in the computation.
Therefore we regain the classical Shapley value.
Consider now the case θ → ∞. There is no convergence and the process
oscillates between coalitions of odd and even cardinalities (2N is a periodic
terminal class). Yet, the process is symmetric for all players. So it suffices
to compute φ1(v) (expressions for φi(v), i 6= 1, can be obtained by a simple
permutation). Figure 3 gives the set of scenarios when t = 3. Let us apply
Proposition 1, since we are in the case of one entering or leaving player at
each step. Observe that there are only 3 types of simple scenarios:
S1 = ∅ − 1, S1,12 = ∅ − 1− 12, S1,12,123 = ∅ − 1− 12− 123
and the others (S2, S3, S1,13 etc.) arise by permutation. We have
ψS11 = v(1), ψ
S2
1 = ψ
S3
1 = 0, ψ
S1,12
1 = ψ
S1,13
1 = v(1)
ψ
S2,12
1 = v(12)− v(2), ψ
S3,13
1 = v(13)− v(3), ψ
S2,23
1 = ψ
S3,23
1 = 0
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Observe that we obtain the classical Shapley value for the simple scenarios of
length 3.
It remains to compute the probability of each equivalence class. At time
step t, there are 3t equiprobable scenarios. Therefore, computing their proba-
bilities amounts to enumerating them. There is only one scenario equivalent to
S1, namely the scenario ∅−1−∅−1−· · · . Therefore π[S1] = 1/3
t = π[S2] = π[S3].
Consider now S1,12. We must have coalition 1 at t = 1, then there are two
choices for t = 2, either ∅ or 12. Again at t = 3, 1 is only one choice, i.e., we
are in the situation as at t = 2. This shows that the probability of scenarios
of length t equivalent to S1,12 is, for t ≥ 2
π[S1,12] =
2⌊t/2⌋ − 1
3t
,
where the “−1” accounts for the scenario equivalent to S1. The same holds for
all scenarios that are equivalent to one of the 6 simple scenarios of length 2.
Then the probability of any scenario equivalent to one of the 6 simple scenarios
of length 3 is by complementarity:
π[S1,12,123 ] =
2⌊t/2⌋+1 + 1
3t−1
.
Observe that t→∞ yields
lim
t→∞
π[S1] = 0, limt→∞
π[S1,12] = 0, etc., limt→∞
π[S1,12,123 ] =
1
6
.
In conclusion:
– The classical Shapley value is the limit of the Shapley I and II values of
the Metropolis process for t→∞.
Example 4 (Voting model with influence) We compute the values Shapley I
and II for the Confucius process. Since scenarios need not begin with the
empty set we start with  and randomly pass next to any set in 2N . Here are
all the maximal scenarios with their probability of occurrence:
S1  → ∅ πS1 = 1/8
S2  → 1→ 2→ 3→ ∅ πS2 = 1/16
S3  → 1→ 2→ 13→ 12→ 123 πS3 = 1/16
S4  → 2→ 3→ ∅ πS4 = 1/16
S5  → 2→ 13→ 12→ 123 πS5 = 1/16
S6  → 3→ ∅ πS6 = 1/8
S7  → 12→ 123 πS7 = 1/8
S8  → 13→ 12→ 123 πS8 = 1/8
S9  → 23→ 13→ 12→ 123 πS9 = 1/8
S10  → 123 πS10 = 1/8
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We have:
φ1(v) =
1
16
(
φS21 (v) + φ
S3
1 (v) + φ
S5
1 (v) + 2φ
S7
1 (v) + 2φ
S8
1 (v) + 2φ
S9
1 (v) + 2φ
S10
1 (v)
)
φ2(v) =
1
16
(
φS22 (v) + φ
S3
2 (v) + φ
S4
2 (v) + φ
S5
2 (v) + 2φ
S7
2 (v) + 2φ
S8
2 (v) + 2φ
S9
2 (v)
+ 2φS102 (v)
)
φ3(v) =
1
16
(
φS23 (v) + φ
S3
3 (v) + φ
S4
3 (v) + φ
S5
3 (v) + 2φ
S6
3 (v) + 2φ
S7
3 (v) + 2φ
S8
3 (v)
+ 2φS93 (v) + 2φ
S10
3 (v)
)
and similarly for the Shapley I value. Skipping lengthy but straightforward
calculations, we find:
φ˜1(v) =
1
48
(
3v(1) + v(2) + 3v(12) + 8v(13)− 3v(23) + 2v(123)
)
φ˜2(v) =
1
48
(
− 3v(1) + 4v(2) + 3v(3) + 12v(12)− 4v(13) + 2v(123)
)
φ˜3(v) =
1
48
(
− 5v(2)− 3v(3)− 15v(12)− 4v(13) + 3v(23) + 26v(123)
)
φ1(v) =
1
16
(
4v(1) + (v(12)− v(2)) + 3(v(13)− v(3)) + 2(v(123)− v(23))
)
φ2(v) =
1
16
(
5(v(12)− v(1)) + 4v(2) + (v(3)− v(23)) + 2(v(123)− v(13)
)
φ3(v) =
1
16
(
(v(1)− v(13)) + 3(v(23)− v(2)) + 2v(3) + 6(v(123)− v(12))
)
As expected by efficiency, one can verify that
3∑
i=1
φ˜i(v) =
3∑
i=1
φi(v) =
5
8
v(123),
corresponds to the probability of 5/8 to reach 123 and 3/8 to reach ∅.
The comparison with the classical Shapley value φS is interesting:
φS1(v) =
1
6
(
2v(1) + (v(12)− v(2)) + 2(v(123)− v(23)) + (v(13)− v(3))
)
φS2(v) =
1
6
(
(v(12)− v(1)) + 2v(2) + 2(v(123)− v(13)) + (v(23)− v(3))
)
φS3(v) =
1
6
(
2(v(123)− v(12)) + (v(13)− v(1)) + (v(23)− v(2)) + 2v(3)
)
Terms are basically the same for Shapley II, however their coefficients differ.
On the other hand, Shapley I has no clear structure. Let us illustrate the idea
with numerical values and suppose that v(S) is the power of S for constructing
a palace. Assume that no individual player can construct a palace alone and
that the wife has little skill to do this so that the power values are
v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = 0, v(12) = 8, v(13) = v(23) = 1, v(123) = 10.
24
The classical Shapley value now yields
φS1(v) = φ
S
2(v) =
27
6
, φS3(v) =
6
6
= 1.
The king and the man have the same power as they are symmetric players.
According to the influence rules, however, the king should have much less
power since he needs the approval of his people to construct a palace. With
our model we find
φ1(v) =
29
16
, φ2(v) =
67
16
, φ3(v) =
14
16
.
Here the king has less then half of the power of the man, which reflects much
more the reality. The computation of Shapley I, on the other hand, leads to
seemingly counterintuitive assessments:
φ˜1(v) =
49
48
, φ˜2(v) =
112
48
, φ˜3(v) =
139
48
.
5 Axiomatizations
We denote by ψ : G → Rn×S a scenario-value, where S is the set of finite
sequences of coalitions (see Section 4.1).
5.1 Basic axioms
Let S = S1 · · ·Sq, S′ = S′1 · · ·S
′
r be two sequences in S. They are concatenable
if Sq = S
′
1, in which case their concatenation is the sequence
S⊕ S′ := S1 · · ·SqS
′
2 · · ·S
′
r.
Concatenation (C): Let S, S′ be two concatenable sequences. Then
ψS⊕S
′
= ψS + ψS
′
.
The shortest sequences are those of length 1, which we will denote by S → T ,
for some S, T ∈ 2N . We call them simply transitions. The concatenation axiom
tells us to restrict attention to transitions. Indeed,
ψS =
t−1∑
k=0
ψSk→Sk+1
for every sequence S = S0S1 · · ·St.
Time Reversality for transitions (TR): Let S → T be a transition.
Then ψS→T = −ψT→S .
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A player i is said to be inactive in a transition S → T if either i 6∈ S ∪ T
or i ∈ S ∩ T (in more compact form, if i 6∈ S∆T ). More generally, i is inactive
in a sequence S if either i 6∈
⋃
S or i ∈
⋂
S.
Inactive players in transitions (IP): If i is inactive in S → T , then
ψS→Ti (v) = 0 for any game v.
Irrelevant Coalitions (IC): Let v, v′ be identical on a sequence S.
Then ψS(v) = ψS(v′).
Axioms (C), (TR), (IP) and (IC) are “new” in cooperative game theory13.
They reflect the idea of a scenario but do not reflect the properties of v. We
introduce now more classical axioms which depend on v.
Efficiency for transitions (E): For any transition S → T and game
v, we have ∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S).
By (IP), (E) reduces to
∑
i∈S∆T ψ
S→T
i (v) = v(T ) − v(S). Also (C) and
(E) imply the efficiency on a sequence, which was introduced in (6).
Linearity for transitions (L): v 7→ ψS→T (v) is a linear operator for
any transition S → T .
(C), (L) and (IC) imply a representation as a linear combination with real
coefficients ai
S,S :
ψSi (v) =
∑
S∈S
aiS,Sv(S). (7)
Symmetry for transitions (S): For any i ∈ N , any transition S → T
and any permutation σ on N , one has
ψS→Ti (v) = ψ
σ(S)→σ(T )
σ(i) (v ◦ σ
−1).
We study the effect of symmetry on transitions.
Lemma 2 Let S → T and S′ → T ′ be two transitions. Then there exists a
permutation σ such that σ(S′ → T ′) = S → T if and only if |S \T | = |S′ \T ′|,
|T \ S| = |T ′ \ S′|, and |S ∩ T | = |S′ ∩ T ′|.
Proof The only if part is obvious. Since |S \ T | = |S′ \ T ′|, there exists a
permutation σ′ such that S \ T = σ′(S′ \ T ′). Similarly, there exist σ′′, σ′′′
such that T \ S = σ′′(T ′ \ S′) and S ∩ T = σ′′′(S′ ∩ T ′), and since S \ T ,
T \S and S∩T are disjoint, there exists a common permutation σ for all three
together, and σ(S′ → T ′) = S → T .
For the following, it is convenient to introduce the signature of a transition
S → T as the parameter
τ(S → T ) := (|S \ T |, |T \ S|, |S ∩ T |).
13 However, (IP) is close to the classical carrier axiom.
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5.2 Axiomatization of the Shapley I scenario-value
Proposition 2 Under (L), (IC), (IP) and (S) we have for any transition
S → T
ψS→Ti (v) =

aτ(S→T ),1v(S) + aτ(S→T ),2v(T ), if i ∈ S \ T
bτ(S→T ),1v(S) + bτ(S→T ),2v(T ), if i ∈ T \ S
0, otherwise,
for some real coefficients aτ(S→T ),1, aτ(S→T ),2, bτ(S→T ),1, and bτ(S→T ),2. More-
over, (TR) implies
aτ(S→T ),1 = −bτ(T→S),2, aτ(S→T ),2 = −bτ(T→S),1.
(See the Appendix for the proof.)
We introduce another axiom that expresses some symmetry between leav-
ing and entering players. It says that the contribution of a leaving player i (in
S \ T ) is the same as that of any entering player j (in T \ S), provided they
are symmetric, i.e., v(K ∪ i) = v(K ∪ j) holds for all K ⊆ N \ {i, j}. In other
words, there is no reason to weigh one higher than the other14.
Symmetry for entering/leaving players (SEL): If S, T ⊆ N are
coalitions with S \ T 6= ∅ and T \ S 6= ∅, any pair i ∈ S \ T , j ∈ T \ S
of symmetric players yields ψS→Ti = ψ
S→T
j .
Theorem 3 A scenario-value satisfies (C), (L), (TR), (IP), (IC), (E), (S)
and (SEL) if and only if it is the Shapley I scenario-value.
(See the Appendix for the proof.)
Axiom (SEL) is debatable. Indeed, one could think of a skew symmetric
property instead:
ψS→Ti = −ψ
S→T
j for i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S.
This modified axiom, however, would not induce a value. As a closer look at
the proof reveals, one would obtain
am,k,l,1 = ak,m,l,2, am,k,l,2 = ak,m,l,1
and
am,k,l,1 = −
1
m− k
am,k,l,2 =
1
m− k
,
14 Observe however that under (S) and (IC) the assumption of symmetry is unnecessary
as soon as |S \ T | or |T \ S| is greater than 1. Indeed, under symmetry of i and j in v, (S)
and (IC) imply that if i, j ∈ S \ T then ψS→Ti = ψ
S→T
j , and similarly for T \ S. In other
words, players in S \ T or T \ S are indistinguishable.
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and therefore ak,m,l,i = −am,k,l,i for i = 1, 2. Observe that the value is un-
defined if |S \ T | = |T \ S| holds. Note furthermore that Shapley II does not
fulfill (SEL).
The counterintuitive nature of (SEL) explains why this value induces re-
sults that are difficult to explain (see Example 4) and shows that it should not
be used in practice, despite of its simple appearance .
5.3 Axiomatization of the Shapley II scenario-value
Recall that i ∈ N is a null player for v if v(S ∪ i) = v(S) for all S ⊆ N \ i. Let
us introduce a null axiom like in the classical framework.
Null axiom for transitions (N): Every is a null player i obtains
ψS→Ti (v) = 0 relative to every transition S → T .
Proposition 3 Assuming (L), (S), and (N), every transition S → T yields
ψS→Ti =

∑
K⊆N\i aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)), if i ∈ S \ T∑
K⊆N\i bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)), if i ∈ T \ S
0, otherwise,
where τ(S → T |K) := (|(S \T )∩K|, |(T \S)∩K|, |S ∩ T ∩K|, |K \ (S ∪ T )|),
and aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i) and bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i) are real coefficients.
Proof Under (L) and (S), (N) implies for any null player i ∈ S \ T :
0 = ψS→Ti (v) =
∑
K⊆N\i
v(K)
(
a′τ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K) + aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)
)
.
Since there is no restriction on v(K), we find
a′τ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K) = −aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i), ∀K ⊆ N \ i. (8)
We introduce another symmetry axiom for entering and leaving players.
We say that players i, j ∈ N are antisymmetric (relative to v) if
v(K)− v(K \ i) = v(K ∪ j)− v(K), ∀K ⊆ N \ j,K ∋ i
v(K)− v(K \ j) = v(K ∪ i)− v(K), ∀K ⊆ N \ i,K ∋ j.
In a more compact form, we stipulate for any K ⊆ N \ i, j:
v(K ∪ i)− v(K) = v(K ∪ ij)− v(K ∪ i)
v(K ∪ j)− v(K) = v(K ∪ ij)− v(K ∪ j).
Antisymmetry for entering/leaving players (ASEL): If i ∈ S \T
and j ∈ T \S are antisymmetric, then ψS→Ti (v) = −ψ
S→T
j (v) holds for
any sequence S → T .
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In contrast to axiom (SEL), (ASEL) expresses a more natural symme-
try between leaving and entering players. The axiom says that if i leaves the
coalition and j enters, their contribution is complementary and of equal mag-
nitude, provided they are antisymmetric in the sense that the loss induced by
one leaving equals the gain induced by the other entering.
Theorem 4 A scenario-value satisfies (C), (L), (IP), (E), (S), (N) and (ASEL)
if and only if it is the Shapley II scenario-value.
(The proof is given in the Appendix.)
We make some final comments.
(i) Shapley II uses fewer axioms than Shapley I. Neither (TR) nor, more im-
portantly, (IC) is needed. A substantial part of the proof is devoted to
infer (IC) from the other axioms, which was not possible for Shapley I.
So the axiomatization of Shapley II is close to the classical axiomatization
of the Shapley value for TU-games: Linearity, null axiom, symmetry and
efficiency. The need of two symmetry axioms is explained below. Observe
also that (IP) is similar to the carrier axiom, which sometimes replaces the
null axiom. Therefore, (N) and (IP) play similar but complementary roˆles.
(ii) The proof uses the maps ΓS(K) := K∆S and vS(K) := v(K∆S) for a given
transition S → T which leads to an interesting aspect of the symmetry
properties. Observing ΓS(S) = ∅ and ΓS(T ) = S∆T , the Shapley II value
on S → T amounts to the classical Shapley value φS on S∆T :
φS→Ti (v) = φ
S
i (vS , S∆T ), ∀i ∈ S∆T.
(iii) The inverse function Γ−1S provides a convenient way to translate classical
values (Shapley, Banzhaf, etc.) into their counterparts in coalition pro-
cesses. It should thus be not too difficult to axiomatize them following the
same philosophy.
(iv) A last important question: Why do we need two symmetry axioms? It is
easy to see that v-antisymmetric players i, j in S → T become classical vS-
symmetric players in S∆T . Because of the signature, the symmetry axiom
allows only the exchange of players that are both in S \ T or in T \ S, or
in S ∩ T . The exchange of players from S \ T to T \ S requires something
more, namely the antisymmetric axiom ASEL. Since players in S∩T do not
matter, the conjunction of (S) and (ASEL) is equivalent with the classical
symmetry axiom.
6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced the model of coalition processes that extends Shapley’s
classical paradigm for the justification of his value. A normal coalition pro-
cess starts from ∅. There is no other restriction imposed on the sequence of
coalitions, which we call scenarios. We show that a coalition process is best
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represented as a Markov chain and we give three important examples of such
process: The Shapley-Weber process, the Metropolis process and voting under
influence (e.g., the Confucius process).
We have formalized and axiomatized two process values, Shapley I and
Shapley II, for the evaluation of the average contribution of individual players
in a given coalition process. The computations of these values for our three
examples and axiomatizations suggest that Shapley II, although more compli-
cated than Shapley I, has nicer properties and is more intuitive. Both values
coincide on coalition processes where only one player can leave or enter a
coalition at each step.
We have shown that our process value can be easily applied to exchange
economies, where it leads to allocations that are more satisfactory than the
ones based on the classical Shapley value.
Finally, we stress that our function ΓS provides a mechanism for translating
any value or power index defined in the classical setting into our framework.
Thus Banzhaf values, Coleman indices, etc. and in particular values arising
from voting under influence can be meaningfully defined for coalition processes.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Nicholas Yannelis for pointing our attention
to exchange economies and for stimulating discussions on the topic.
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7 Proof of Proposition 2
By (L), (IC) and (7), any transition S → T and permutation σ yields
ψS→Ti (v) = a
i
S→T,Sv(S) + a
i
S→T,T v(T )
ψ
σ(S→T )
σ(i) (v ◦ σ
−1) = a
σ(i)
σ(S→T ),σ(S)v(S) + a
σ(i)
σ(S→T ),σ(T )v(T ).
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Applying (S), we find
aiS→T,S = a
σ(i)
σ(S→T ),σ(S) (9)
and similarly for aiS→T,T , for any σ, S, T and i. By Lemma 2 we see that
aiS→T,S , a
i
S→T,T can be replaced by a
i
τ(S→T ),1,, a
i
τ(S→T ),2 respectively.
Now suppose that σ(S) = S and σ(T ) = T . Then i ∈ S ⇒ σ(i) ∈ S,
i ∈ T ⇒ σ(i) ∈ T , i ∈ S ∩ T ⇒ σ(i) ∈ S ∩ T , and i 6∈ S ∪ T → σ(i) 6∈
S ∪ T . Therefore, (9) implies aiτ(S→T ),1 = a
j
τ(S→t),1 for any i, j ∈ S , and the
analogous equality for i, j ∈ T . Since all players in S ∩ T and outside S ∪ T
are inactive, the result follows from axiom (IP).
Finally, if (TR) holds, we have ψS→Ti = −ψ
T→S . Since active players are
the same in S → T and in T → S, we obtain for i ∈ S \ T
aτ(S→T ),1v(S) + aτ(S→T ),2v(T ) = −bτ(T→S),1v(T )− bτ(T→S),2v(S)
which, together with the case i ∈ T \S, yields the desired result by identifica-
tion.
8 Proof of Theorem 3
The if-part is left to the reader. Since (C) is satisfied, it suffices to derive an
expression for transitions.
Assuming (L), (TR), (IP), (IC) and (S), and settingm := |S\T |, k := |T \S|
and l := |S ∩ T | efficiency implies:∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S)
=
∑
i∈S\T
(
am,k,l,1v(S) + am,k,l,2v(T )
)
−
∑
i∈T\S
(
ak,m,l,2v(S) + ak,m,l,1v(T )
)
= v(S)
(
mam,k,l,1 − kak,m,l,2
)
+ v(T )
(
mam,k,l,2 − kak,m,l,1
)
.
Since this holds for any v, we obtain the system
mam,k,l,1 − kak,m,l,2 = −1
mam,k,l,2 − kak,m,l,1 = 1.
Axiom (SEL) implies
am,k,l,1v(S) + am,k,l,2v(T ) = −ak,m,l,2v(S)− ak,m,l,1v(T )
for any v where there are two symmetric players i, j with i ∈ S\T and j ∈ T \S.
If |S \T | or |T \S| > 1 we may put freely v(S) = 0 or v(T ) = 0, which implies
am,k,l,1 = −ak,m,l,2, am,k,l,2 = −ak,m,l,1
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for anym, k, l such thatm 6= 1, k 6= 1. If |S\T | = |T \S| = 1, then S = (S∩T )∪i
and T = (S ∩ T ) ∪ j, which implies v(S) = v(T ). This yields
a1,1,l,1 + a1,1,l,2 = −a1,1,l,1 − a1,1,l,2 = 0
and hence the above relation holds also for m = k = 1. Substituting into the
above system yields
am,k,l,1 = −
1
m+ k
= ak,m,l,1 am,k,l,2 =
1
m+ k
= ak,m,l,2.
9 Proof of Theorem 4
The if-part is left to the reader. Since (C) is satisfied, it suffices to derive an
expression for transitions. Under (L), (IP) (S), (N), axiom (E) implies:∑
i∈N
ψS→Ti (v) = v(T )− v(S)
=
∑
i∈S\T
∑
K⊆N\i
aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K))
+
∑
i∈T\S
∑
K⊆N\i
bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i)(v(K ∪ i)− v(K))
=
∑
K⊆N
v(K)
(
klaτ,kl,kr ,kc,k0 + krbτ,kl,kr ,kc,k0
− (l − kl)aτ,kl+1,kr ,kc,k0 − (r − kr)bτ,kl,kr+1,kc,k0
)
,
with the following notations: τ(S → T ) =: τ , |S \ T | =: l, |T \ S| =: r,
|S∩T | =: c, |K| = k, τ(S → T |K) = (kl, kr, kc, k0), with k0 = k−kl−kr−kc =
|K \ (S ∪ T )|. Let us drop also the subindex τ since it is present everywhere.
This gives by identification:
lal,0,c,0 − rbl,1,c,0 = −1 (10)
−la1,r,c,0 + rb0,r,c,0 = 1 (11)
klakl,kr,kc,k0 + krbkl,kr ,kc,k0 − (l − kl)akl+1,kr ,kc,k0
−(r − kr)bkl,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0, ∀K 6= S, T.
(12)
1. Suppose that S ⊂ T holds, i.e., τ = (0, t − s, s). Then l = kl = 0,
r = t− s, c = s, and (10), (11) yield b0,1,s,0 =
1
t−s and b0,r,s,0 =
1
t−s , and the
remaining equations become:
krb0,kr,kc,k0 − (r − kr)b0,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0, ∀K 6= S, T.
If K ∩ T \ S = ∅, this reduces to
b0,1,kc,k0 = 0, ∀kc, k0 (13)
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except the case (kc = s, k0 = 0), which corresponding to S. Similarly,K ⊇ T \S
yields
b0,t−s,kc,k0 = 0, ∀kc, k0, (14)
except in the case (kc = s, k0 = 0), which corresponds to T .
So it remains to examine the case where all K satisfy K ∩ (T \ S) 6= ∅ and
K 6⊇ T \ S (i.e., 0 < kr < t− s). We prove by induction that b0,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0
holds for all 0 < kr < t − s and kc, k0, except for kc = s, k0 = 0, i.e., for
K = S ∪ L with ∅ 6= L ⊂ T \ S, where
b0,kr+1,s,0 =
kr!
(t− s) · · · (t− s− kr)
.
For kr = 1, we have
b0,1,kc,k0 − (r − 1)b0,2,kc,k0 = 0.
From (13) we get b0,1,kc,k0 = 0 except if (kc = s, k0 = 0), which entails
b0,2,kc,k0 = 0 for all kc, k0 except b0,2,s,0 =
1
(t−s)(t−s−1) , the expected result.
Assume that the assumption is true up to kr and compute the case kr + 1,
assuming kr + 1 < t− s. We find
(kr + 1)b0,kr+1,kc,k0 − (r − kr − 1)b0,kr+2,kc,k0 = 0
By the assumption, the first term vanishes for all kc, k0, except for kc = s and
k0 = 0. This implies the second term to vanish except when
b0,kr+2,s,0 =
(kr + 1)!
(t− s) · · · (t− s− kr)(t− s− kr − 1)
.
Therefore, the expression of ψS→Ti becomes
ψS→Ti (v) =
∑
K⊇S
K⊆T\i
(t− s− kr − 1)!kr!
(t− s)!
(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)),
which is the expression of the Shapley value for a game on the set T \ S.
2. The case T ⊂ S is analyzed similarly.
3. It remains to settle the case where S \ T 6= ∅ and T \ S 6= ∅ hold. Take
any i ∈ S \ T and j ∈ T \ S. We have for any K ⊆ N \ i, j
v(K ∪ i)− v(K) = v(K ∪ ij)− v(K ∪ i)
whenever i, j are antisymmetric in v. The coefficient of v(K ∪ i) − v(K) in
ψS→Ti (v) is aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i), while bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪ij) is the coefficient
of v(K∪ij)−v(K∪i) in ψS→Tj (v). By (ASEL) we have ψ
S→T
i (v) = −ψ
S→T
j (v)
for any such v, which implies aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i) = −bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪ij).
Similarly, from the relation
v(K ∪ j)− v(K) = v(K ∪ ij)− v(K ∪ j)
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we deduce aτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪i,j) = −bτ(S→T ),τ(S→T |K∪j). These relations be-
ing valid for any K ⊆ N \ i, j and any i ∈ S \ T , j ∈ T \ S, we deduce the
system
akl,kr,kc,k0 = −bkl,kr+1,kc,k0 , 1 ≤ kl ≤ l, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r − 1
akl+1,kr,kc,k0 = −bkl,kr ,kc,k0 , 0 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, 1 ≤ kr ≤ r,
for 0 ≤ kc ≤ c, 0 ≤ k0 ≤ n−|S∪T |, with the above conventions. Substituting
in (10), (11) we obtain
al,0,c,0 = −
1
l+ r
, a1,r,c,0 = −
1
l + r
. (15)
Substitution into (12) leads to
(kl + r − kr)akl,kr,kc,k0 − (kr + l − kl)akl+1,kr ,kc,k0 = 0 (16)
with the restriction 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, 1 ≤ kr ≤ r − 1. For the remaining cases,
we get:
−(l + kr)a1,kr ,kc,k0 + (r − kr)a1,kr+1,kc,k0 = 0, kl = 0, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r (17)
(kl + r)akl,0,kc,k0 − (l − kl)akl+1,0,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, kr = 0
(18)
klakl,r,kc,k0 − (l − kl + r)akl+1,r,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l − 1, kr = r
(19)
(l + r − kr)al,kr ,kc,k0 − kral,kr−1,kc,k0 = 0, kl = l, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r, (20)
where in the above 4 equations, coefficients al,0,c,0 and a1,r,c,0 are excluded: this
precisely concerns equation (17) with (kr = r, kc = c, k0 = 0), equation (18)
with (kl = l − 1, kc = c, k0 = 0), equation (19) with (kl = 1, kc = c, k0 = 0),
and equation (20) with (kr = 0 or 1, kc = c, k0 = 0).
We claim that all coefficients corresponding to K \(S∪T ) 6= ∅ (i.e., k0 > 0)
or K 6⊇ (S ∩ T ) (i.e., kc < c) vanish. Suppose then that k0 > 0 and kc < c
is given. From (20) with kr = 0, we deduce al,0,kc,k0 = 0. Substitution in (18)
with kl = l − 1 yields al−1,0,kc,k0 = 0. Successive application of (18), again
with kl = l− 2, . . . , 1, yields
akl,0,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
Since al,0,kc,k0 is also present in (20) with kr = 1, we have al,1,kc,k0 = 0. Now, in
(16), al,1,kc,k0 is present with (kl = l−1, kr = 1), which yields al−1,1,kc,k0 = 0.
Applying again (16) with kl = l − 2, . . . , 1 we deduce
akl,1,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
al,1,kc,k0 is present also in (20) with kr = 2. Proceeding as above we get
akl,2,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
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This can be done until kr = r in (20), which gives al,r,kc,k0 = 0. Then (19) has
to be used with kl = l− 1 and so on. This yields
akl,r,kc,k0 = 0, 1 ≤ kl ≤ l.
In summary, akl,kr ,kc,k0 = 0 holds for 1 ≤ kl ≤ l, 0 ≤ kr ≤ r, 0 ≤ kc < c and
0 < k0 ≤ n − |S ∪ T |, and our claim is proved. Therefore, for i ∈ S \ T , the
value reduces to
ψS→Ti (v) =
∑
K⊆(S∪T )\i
K⊇S∩T
al,r,c,kl+1,kr,c,0(v(K ∪ i)− v(K)).
Note that al,r,c,kl+1,kr ,c,0 can be simplified into al,r,c,kl+1,kr . If we apply the
mapping ΓS defined above, this coefficient depends solely on |S∆T | and |S∆K|,
and thus reduces to al+r,l−kl−1+kr . Therefore, we obtain
ψ∅→S∆Ti (v) =
∑
K⊆(S∆T )\i
al+r,k+1(vS(K ∪ i)− vS(K)).
Observe that this can be seen as a value for the classical game vS on S∆T ,
satisfying linearity, the classical null axiom and symmetry. Moreover, through
ΓS , efficiency (E) turns into classical efficiency. Therefore, it must the classical
Shapley value φS∆Ti (vS). Since we have the equality φ
S→T
i (v) = φ
S∆T
i (vS)
already observed to hold, the proof is complete as the case i ∈ T \ S proceeds
similarly.
